

## Scholarly Debates in War Studies

Theme Title		
<b>Bargaining Theory and the Study of Modern Warfare</b>		
No of credits (ECTS): 7,5	Course dates: 2025	
Course director: Jan Ångström	Examiner: Jan Ångström	
The course was reviewed by the Research Committee in War Studies:		2024-04-08
The course was approved by the Director of Studies		2024-05-12

Theme Description
<p>The course centers on the bargaining theory of war, arguably the dominant paradigm in the study of modern warfare. The bargaining model has even been referred to as a unified theory of war, i.e., aspiring to explain the causes, dynamics, and resolution of war. Throughout the course, these bold claims are evaluated and central concepts such as rationality, war, escalation, deterrence and coercion are critically examined in terms of their coherence with the rest of the theory, their explanatory reach and explanatory power.</p>
Learning Outcomes
<p>By the end of the course, the doctoral student should be able to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- systematically describe and evaluate the research in the subfield of the research group, with particular focus on the research with the greatest relevance for the own thesis topic</li><li>- identify, contrast and problematise the scholarly debates in the subfield of the research group</li><li>- engage critically with the state-of-the-art research in the subfield of the research group</li><li>- identify the contributions of the student's own research to the subfield of the research group</li><li>- clearly communicate, both orally and in writing, the content, arguments and conclusions in the course literature and independent analysis</li></ul>
Assessment
<p>The course is examined through active participation in six research group seminars and a written assignment of between 5000-7000 words, in which the doctoral student critically discusses and problematises the debates of the subfield as well as their own contribution to the field. The written assignment should also be presented at the research group seminar.</p>

**Readings**

Total number of pages: 3300 pages

**Rationality and the study of war (550 p)**

Susan Lindee, *Rational Fog: Science and Technology in Modern War* (Harvard University Press, 2020).

Paul Erickson, et.al. *How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

**Bargaining and war (240 p)**

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, tr. Peter Paret & Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), select, pp. 75-99.

Andreas Herberg-Rothe, "Clausewitz's Concept of Strategy", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37: 6-7 (2014), pp. 903-925.

Hew Strachan & Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.) *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford University Press, 2007), select Strachan, Moran, Heuser, Honig.

Robert Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5:1 (2002), pp. 1-30.

Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War", *Perspectives on Politics*, 1:1 (2003), pp. 27-43.

Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations", *American Political Science Review*, 97:4 (2003), pp. 621-632.

Alistair Smith & Allan Stam, "Bargaining and the Nature of War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48:6 (2004), pp. 783-813.

**Escalation (700 p)**

Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1978).

Herman Kahn, *On Escalation* (Routledge, 1965).

**Cold War deterrence (600 p)**

Lawrence Freedman, *The evolution of nuclear strategy* (London, MacMillan, 1986).

Schelling, Thomas, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966).

Scott D. Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: Norton, 2002).

**Nuclear deterrence – today (700 p)**

Thérèse Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy* (RAND, 2012).

Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era* (Princeton University Press, 2014).

Matthew Kroenig, *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters* (Oxford University Press, 2020).

**Coercion – compellence – brute force (500 p)**

Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Strategic Coercion* (Oxford University Press, 1998).

Greenhill & Krause, *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).