How smaller states can create operational depth without extensive resources

What does depth mean in military operations, and how can it be applied when physical space is limited? In his doctoral thesis, Anders Ekholm develops a new way of thinking about operational depth, one that focuses on problem-solving, creativity and adaptation rather than geography.

In his research, Anders Ekholm, Colonel and PhD in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University, shows how smaller actors can create the conditions needed to influence a stronger opponent. Through field studies in Israel, he challenges established ideas about the operational art and highlights the importance of creativity, adaptability, and cognitive depth in modern military operations.

“In warfare, we often talk about the need for operational depth, having time and space to manoeuvre, defend, and counterattack. But what happens when a state simply lacks that physical depth? Is it still possible to create freedom of action and achieve military effect? That is the core question in my thesis”, says Anders Ekholm.

Israel as a case study

He has examined how Israel has developed an operational doctrine despite its geographical limitations. Through interviews with Israeli generals, participation in military exercises, and analysis of actual operations, he gained insights into how Israel compensates for its lack of physical depth.

Depth is more than geography

One of the key conclusions in the thesis is that operational depth is not solely about geography.

“We need to think more broadly, depth can also be cognitive. It’s about creating room for action through innovative thinking, flexibility, and the ability to surprise the opponent.”

From linear to circular thinking

Traditionally, military operations have been described as linear – with a front line on one end and a protected area behind it. Depth has then been seen as a physical distance to the rear, where logistics, command, and reserves are located. According to Anders Ekholm, this model is outdated in today’s conflicts.

“In an era where threats can come from any direction, and where both technological and informational dimensions play a key role, we need to think more circularly than linearly”, he says.

The thesis shows how the linear way of thinking emerged during the 19th and 20th centuries, when industrial armies and state-based warfare dominated. In today’s conflict environments, where both state and non-state actors operate simultaneously across multiple domains, it is more relevant to view depth as a dynamic and situational concept.

Rather than being limited to physical geography, Ekholm argues that depth should also be understood in relation to factors such as time, vulnerability, tactics, and perception – that is, how different actors perceive threats and decide how to act.

“Depth exists wherever an actor is vulnerable, whether far behind the front line or within a cyber network”, he explains.

A framework for military planning

One of the contributions of the thesis is a new framework designed to help analysts and military planners understand depth in a modern context. By combining historical examples with conceptual analysis and military theory, Anders Ekholm demonstrates how a more versatile approach can lead to better decision-making.

He has also developed a so-called circular model, a tool for analysing, understanding, and maximising the use of available resources. In this respect, the Israeli Defence Forces provide a striking, if sometimes controversial, example, particularly in traditional, hierarchy-driven military organisations:

“The Israeli generals I interviewed frequently described how the rules, constraints, and traditions maintained by their own organisation require deliberate manipulation. The purpose is to create alternative courses of action that increase operational effect and enable the opponent to be surprised and defeated.”

Relevant for contemporary and future warfare

According to Anders Ekholm, the thesis has great relevance for military education, planning, and analysis. He also stresses that Sweden, as a smaller actor within a larger defence alliance such as NATO, must be able to navigate between following collective doctrines and contributing with its own capabilities and flexibility.

“It means we must both speak the language of doctrine and think beyond it. For smaller states with limited resources but great ambitions, a cognitive and circular understanding of operational depth can be a way forward”, he concludes.